Olamide Samuel for AlJazeera News: The war on Iran is eroding nuclear non-proliferation

In a new opinion piece for Al Jazeera, Olamide Samuel, ONN Network and Engagement Specialist, argues that the war on Iran is eroding confidence in the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and the wider nuclear non-proliferation regime.

The article, “The war on Iran is eroding nuclear non-proliferation,” was published as states parties gathered in New York for the 2026 NPT Review Conference. It examines how US-Israeli attacks on Iran, justified as a response to nuclear proliferation concerns, risk weakening the very framework designed to address those concerns through safeguards, inspections, diplomacy, and institutional oversight.

Samuel argues that Iran’s nuclear activities have raised serious and legitimate concerns, including unresolved safeguards issues, limited inspector access, and enrichment far beyond normal civilian requirements. But he also notes that the IAEA had not found evidence of a structured nuclear weapons programme, and that the use of force against safeguarded nuclear facilities does not create the clarity, access, or verification needed for non-proliferation.

At the centre of the article is a larger question for the NPT Review Conference: does NPT membership offer any meaningful protection for non-nuclear-weapon states? If states can remain below the nuclear weapons threshold, accept safeguards in principle, and still face military attack on nuclear facilities, the credibility of the NPT bargain is weakened.

The piece also situates the Iran crisis within the treaty’s wider legal and political architecture. It highlights Article IV and the right to peaceful nuclear technology, the role of the IAEA in verification, the unresolved question of a Middle East zone free of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction, and the regional imbalance created by Israel’s nuclear opacity and non-membership in the NPT.

Samuel argues that states parties should not allow the NPT’s basic bargain to be rewritten by war. They can press Iran on safeguards and compliance while also rejecting attacks on safeguarded nuclear facilities, defending verification, and reaffirming that coercive counterproliferation is not a substitute for durable nuclear diplomacy.