-
The DPRK launched an intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) on 18 November 2022. The reported apogee and top speed of Mach 22 correspond to an ICBM with a ~15,000 km range. This is the DPRK's fifth apparently successful ICBM launch (Table 1).
-
The ICBM type is yet to be confirmed, but it could be the first successful Hwasong-17 launch after several possible partial or failed flight tests this year. [1]
-
The launch came one day after DPRK Foreign Minister Choe Son Hui stated that the DPRK will take "fiercer… military counteraction" if the USA strengthens its extended deterrence to the ROK and Japan. [2]
-
Choe's press statement and the ICBM launch came in the wake of the ASEAN summit last week. On the sidelines of the summit, the US, ROK and Japanese leaders agreed to strengthen security cooperation and Washington renewed its commitment to bolster extended deterrence in the region. During the US-China and ROK-China G20 summit meetings on 14 to 15 November 2022, both the US and ROK presidents voiced concern about the DPRK's recent military activities. However, the Chinese Foreign Ministry readouts of these meetings did not mention the DPRK issue.
-
As an immediate response, the ROK and USA held a joint air strike drill simulating attacks on mobile missile launchers. [3] ROK president Yoon Suk Yeol ordered the strengthening of (unspecified) extended deterrence measures after the ICBM test. [4]
-
The DPRK's latest ICBM launch is in line with the Korean People's Army (KPA) General Staff "report" on 7 November 2022, which stated that "the more persistently the enemies' provocative military moves continue, the more thoroughly and mercilessly the KPA will counter them. This is the principle and direction of action of the DPRK's armed forces in the future, too." [5] Chinese leader Xi Jinping’s lack of clear response to the ROK president's request for China to play a "more active and constructive role" in the DPRK issue, together with the omission of the DPRK in the Chinese Foreign Ministry 14 November 2022 daily briefing, may have provided Kim Jong Un with an opening to conduct the latest ICBM test. [6]
-
Since late September 2022, the DPRK has conducted two major missile launch campaigns, coinciding with joint and individual military drills of the ROK, USA and Japan. [7] ONN will continue to track the situation and produce further analysis as needed.
Table 1. ICBM tests conducted by the DPRK*
*Possible partial or failed tests of the Hwasong-17 ICBM, conducted on 27 February, 5 March, 16 March, 4 May, 25 May, 3 November 2022, are not included in this table.
**The DPRK claimed the missile to be a Hwasong-17. However, the ROK and the USA assessed it to be a Hwasong-15 and alledged that the DPRK used previously unseen footage of a failed Hwasong-17 launch to disguise the launch.
***According to data released by the ROK and Japan. The data for the other four ICBM launches were released by the DPRK and they are in general agreement with data released by the ROK.
Updates, 21 November 2022
The DPRK released an official report on the 18 November 2022 intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM), confirming that it was a Hwasong-17 and stating that the missile flew 999.2 km with an apogee of 6,040.9 km over ~68.9 minutes. This is consistent with the ROK assessment. [8] Based on newly released information, ONN has made the following observations:
-
A comparison between the Hwasong-17 18 November 2022 launch photos (released on 19 November 2022) and 24 March 2022 (Figure 1) indicates that ~7.5% of propellant volume from the first stage has been moved to the second stage, which leads to an increase in second stage propellant volume by ~40%. Small adjustments have also been made accordingly to the positions of retro rockets (small solid-propellant rockets to push away the first stage after stage separation). The reasons behind the change in propellant volumes are not immediately clear; however, they could include factors such as higher propellant consumption rate caused by an increase in thrust of the second stage engine(s) or an increase in the number of second stage engine(s).
Figure 1. Differences between the two Hwasong-17 prototypes. Images: KCNA
-
Other small modifications are also visible in the video released on 19 November 2022 by KCTV, such as a slightly different arrangement of fairing removal rockets (small solid-propellant rockets that push the aerodynamic fairing away from the second stage once the ICBM reaches a certain altitude, Figure 2) and the addition of eight suspected small solid-propellant rockets on the second stage (Figure 2).
Figure 2. Inside red box: fairing removal rockets; Inside yellow box: possible nozzles of eight small rockets whose role may be to help ensure a smooth separation of the warhead after second stage burnout. Image: KCTV
-
The 18 November 2022 launch is the first apparently successful launch of the Hwasong-17 ICBM after six suspected partial or failed flight tests (Table 2). [9] In comparison, the flight tests of Hwasong-14 and Hwasong-15 ICBMs, which share the same engine technologies with the Hwasong-17 (Figure 3), were conducted without known failures. The extraordinary size of the Hwasong-17 and associated complexities may have been a contributing factor behind the unsuccessful flight tests.
Table 2. Suspected incomplete flight tests of Hwasong-17.
Figure 3. Common engine technologies shared by the DPRK's new generation of liquid-propellant ballistic missiles. Images: KCNA, annotated by ONN
-
These observations suggest that the Hwasong-17 ICBM has undergone modifications to improve performance and/or reliability. It is possible that more Hwasong-17 launches are planned in the future in order to fully consolidate the design of the missile. [10] The DPRK may also test space launch vehicles that are based on the Hwasong-17 in the future.
-
To date, all ICBM tests of the DPRK have been carried out in highly lofted trajectories. It is uncertain if the DPRK has gathered enough data to become confident that the warhead would function properly with normal re-entry angle into the atmosphere, or if the DPRK plans to conduct flight tests under more realistic conditions in the future. During his summit with Chinese leader Xi Jinping on 14 November 2022, US President Joe Biden reportedly stated that China "had an obligation to attempt to make it clear to North Korea that they should not engage in long range nuclear tests." [11] What "long-range nuclear tests" entails in this context, however, is unclear.
-
Both Hwasong-15 and Hwasong-17 are large, liquid-propellant ballistic missiles. Their tolerance to unideal road conditions and long-duration road trips is unclear. It is possible that these ICBMs remain highly dependent on their home bases and could only operate within a small radius of their bases, making their movement easy to monitor by foreign military intelligence agencies.
-
The DPRK has used old images in their recent reports covering missile launch events, making it more difficult to identify confidently what projectiles were launched. [12] Additionally, it degrades the credibility of the DPRK's official account on its missile launches, including that of intermediate and intercontinental range. For example, the ROK alleged that the DPRK successfully launched a Hwasong-15 ICBM on 24 March 2022 and disguised the launch as that of a Hwasong-17 by using previously unpublished Hwasong-17 videos and photos. [13] Similarly, the DPRK released photos on 4 November 2022 showing what appears to be a Hwasong-15 or its variant being launched on the previous day (Figure 4). However, the ROK insisted that the missile launched on 3 November 2022 was a failed Hwasong-17 (Table 2).
Figure 4. Hwasong-15 (or its variant [14]) photos released on 4 November 2022 by the DPRK. Images: KCNA