ONN Webinar Recap: North Korea’s Nuclear Path – Where Next?

On 8 April 2025, Open Nuclear Network (ONN) hosted a public webinar titled “North Korea’s Nuclear Path: Where Next?”, to discuss ONN’s work on a multi-year research initiative on the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK)’s weapons of mass destruction (WMD) programme. The event brought together leading experts to explore North Korea’s evolving nuclear capabilities and assess how forecasting, satellite imagery and fuel cycle analysis can illuminate the country’s future nuclear trajectory. 

Moderated by Kseniia Pirnavskaia, ONN’s Engagement Coordinator, the session highlighted ONN’s unique methodological approaches to nuclear risk reduction. The discussion reflected ONN’s contributions to a broader international project led by the Verification Research, Training and Information Centre (VERTIC), James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies (CNS) and Royal United Services Institute for Defence and Security Studies (RUSI), funded by Global Affairs Canada. 

Featured Speakers 

• Sarah Laderman, Senior Analyst at ONN
• Marcy R. Fowler, Research & Analysis Manager at ONN
• Grant Christopher, Co-Programme Director for Verification and Monitoring at VERTIC 

Presentation Highlights: Research Findings by Sarah Laderman 

The webinar began with a compelling presentation by Sarah Laderman, showcasing findings from four major ONN publications: 

• DPRK Nuclear Futures Workshop
• Fissile Material and Nuclear Force Structure in North Korea
• DPRK Nuclear Weapons Development – Literature Review
• Size Estimates of DPRK's Nuclear Devices 

Sarah outlined the project's granular analysis of the interaction between North Korea’s fissile material production and its nuclear strategy, arsenal design and nuclear force structure, which included future-oriented forecasting based on technical, strategic and geopolitical developments. The research combines nuclear fuel cycle and weaponisation analysis, expert elicitation, satellite imagery analysis, comparative modelling and scenario-based forecasting methods to examine North Korea’s nuclear strategy, constraints and possible futures through 2029. 

Key insights included: 

• Strategic Goals: The DPRK aims to field a diversified, operationally flexible nuclear force to preserve regime security.
• Arsenal Size: Based on ONN’s modelling, North Korea would require between 105 to 235 warheads to meet its assessed military objectives.
• Design & Material Use: At least two designs likely exist in the arsenal – a single-stage implosion device and a two-stage thermonuclear weapon.
• Fissile Material Estimates: North Korea may currently possess 42–47 kg of plutonium and 743–1,862 kg of highly enriched uranium.
• Forecasting Futures: Geopolitical shifts and technological advancements could affect the number of nuclear weapons North Korea possesses in 2029, shifting the baseline anywhere form -4% to +15%.  

“Each individual driver might only change the arsenal at the margin. It could be the accumulation of drivers that makes big impacts.” – Sarah Laderman 

Moderated Panel Discussion: Strategic Implications 

Following the presentation, Marcy R. Fowler and Grant Christopher joined for a moderated discussion exploring the broader strategic, political and methodological implications of the research. 

1. Why This Research, and Why Now? 

Speakers emphasised that while public interest in the DPRK nuclear issue has waned, the risks remain acute. Now is the time to apply innovative methodologies and build readiness for future negotiation opportunities.  

• “The development of satellite imagery use by NGOs… really enables this kind of work.” – Grant Christopher 

2. Forecasting as a Tool for Nuclear Analysis 

The panel highlighted how techniques such as Delphi methodology, scenario analysis and structured forecasting helped identify insights that more traditional approaches may miss – especially the internal logic and independence of DPRK decision-making. 

• “I got a clearer understanding of the independence of the DPRK's nuclear programme… and that it's really internally driven. I don't think that I would have actually come to that assessment had I just used the same old techniques.” – Marcy R. Fowler 
  
• “Forecasting isn't the most eloquent argument that wins… it's the board and the voting.” – Grant Christopher 

3. US Elections and DPRK Policy 

Contrary to conventional wisdom, participants of the forecasting workshop found that changes in US leadership would have minimal impact on DPRK’s trajectory. 

• “DPRK opened itself up for negotiations last time. And they were burned.” – Grant Christopher
• “DPRK's nuclear arsenal trajectory is self-directed. Even if negotiations start, the incentives for North Korea are the same as they were before.” – Marcy R. Fowler 

4. Realistic Goals for Negotiation 

Panelists agreed that risk reduction, verification and containment – rather than full denuclearisation – should guide international engagement strategies going forward. 

• “Complete, Verifiable, Irreversible Dismantlement (CVID) is not realistic at this point. The arsenal has been enshrined in the Constitution.” – Marcy R. Fowler
• “If it is again a policy of complete irreversible disarmament – they're fantasists.” – Grant Christopher 

5. DPRK as a Nuclear Power: Recognition and Consequences 

The discussion addressed the growing ambiguity surrounding North Korea’s de facto recognition as a nuclear power and the potential erosion of non-proliferation norms. 

• “There is no ability for North Korea to become a nuclear weapon state under the NPT… So, these declarations are a bit confusing.” – Marcy R. Fowler 

6. South Korean Nuclear Latency 

Despite public interest, panelists noted the high political and technical barriers to South Korean nuclear weaponisation. 

• “Any move toward such a programme would very likely be seen by the international community quite early on.” – Marcy R. Fowler