ONN's publication "Improving Data Access and Credibility In Low-Information Environments: Case Of DPRK" was introduced along with comments from ONN Analysts Tianran Xu and Jaewoo Shin and ONN Regional Issues Manager and Senior Analyst Rachel Minyoung Lee.
"Together with members of the Open Nuclear Network (ONN), a private research organization headquartered in Vienna, Austria, I thought about North Korea's information strategy of 'showing only what it wants to see.'
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In November last year, ONN released a report titled "IMPROVING DATA ACCESS AND CREDIBILITY IN LOW-INFORMATION ENVIRONMENTS: CASE OF DPRK," summarizing the key points of North Korea's information analysis. First, the report points out that North Korea's official coverage should be judged based on five key factors: 'level, audience, timing, tone, and others.'
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It's also important to think about 'who is North Korea talking to?' said Rachel Lee, senior analyst at ONN. North Korea released various missile launches and air force drills on October 10. Lee said, 'Externally, we will appeal North Korea's military readiness and progress in weapons development, as well as the policies that Kim Jong Un emphasized in January 2021, and will respond strongly to external forces' hard line. There is a message: Internally, the aim is to reassure the public by showing that the enemy's threat can be thwarted.'
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'Although it is possible to estimate when known reconnaissance satellites will pass over a particular location, many commercial satellites pass over North Korea throughout the day,' said ONN analyst Jaewoo Shin. North Korea may have shifted more activity to nighttime to make early detection more difficult: many of its missile launches and artillery bombardments in October also took place at night.Synthetic Aperture Radar (SAR). 'We can see activity at night, but the area covered is not as large as during the day.'
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'North Korea, which has strict information controls, sometimes makes mistakes,' said ONN analyst Tianran Xu. A 2015 documentary released by North Korea's Korean Central Television showed Kim Jong Il inspecting the Hwasong-13 ICBM, Xu said. A closer analysis of the screen reveals the missile's first stage engine. From the images, the Hwasong-13 could be estimated to have two former Soviet R-27 SLBM engines or two Hwasong-10 engines with a total lift of 50 tons. Mars 10 and Mars 13 may have been abandoned after the program turned out to be a failure. 'The image was very difficult to grasp and was overlooked by many analysts,' Xu said."
